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)
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)

JURISDICTION AND
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1953, as amended) and Utah
Code Annotated, Section 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953, as amended).

This

is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of a Class B
Misdemeanor by the Third Circuit Court tried to the bench without
a jury by the Honorable Judge Phillip K. Palmer, Third Circuit
Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for
Concealing Identity by failing to provide information about his
identity as requested by a Salt Lake City Police officer, a Class
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 11-04-100 of the Salt Lake
Code (1988).

The defendant/appellant, represented by his

attorney of record, Charles F. Loyd, Jr., was found guilty after

a bench trial.

The court sentenced the defendant to two days

jail and fines and fees of $50.00, with the two days

jail

suspended upon payment of the fines and fees.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Does Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 prohibiting any

person from concealing or attempting to conceal his or her
identity from a police officer encompass as a violation
defendant's refusal to provide identification to police officers
when requested?
2.

Is Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 unconstitutional

and thereby unenforceable under the U.S. Supreme Court's holding
in Kolender v. Lawson 461 US 352 (1982).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES, ORDINANCES RULES AND REGULATIONS
Section 11-04-100 Salt Lake City Ordinances.
CONCEALING IDENTITY OR FURNISHING FALSE INFORMATION
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally
conceal or attempt to conceal is or her identity, falsely
identify himself or herself, or furnish or give false or
misleading information to any person charged with
enforcement of city ordinances, including but not limited to
the following:
A.

Any police officer of the city corporation;

B.

An employee of the city fire department;

C.

An employee of the city-county health department
enforcing the city health ordinances;

D.

Parking enforcement officers;

E.

City licensing personnel;

F.

Zoning enforcement officers;

G.

Planning officials; and/or

H.

Building officials.

Section 77-7-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
BY PEACE OFFICERS
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
1.

For any public offense committed or attempted in
the presence of any peace officer; "presence"
includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of
any physical sense, or records the observations of
any of the physical senses;

2.

When he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and has reasonable cause to
believe that the person arrested has committed it;

3.

When he has reasonable cause to believe the person
has committed a public offense, and there is
reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property
belonging to another person.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Point I.

Salt Lake City ordinance 11-04-100 was violated

when the defendant refused to provide identifying information
when he was requested to do so by a Salt Lake City officer.

This

failure constituted the offense of concealing identity as defined
in the ordinance.
POINT II. Defendant's young appearance, intoxicated
condition and possession of alcohol constituted facts sufficient
to give rise to reasonable suspicion for the officer to make a
"Terry" stop and constituted probable cause for an arrest.
POINT III. Salt Lake Ordinance 11-04-100 is not
unconstitutionally vague under Kolender v. Lawson, because it
does not leave open for the officer? s discretion what

constitutes "reasonable and proper" identification.

It only

requires that the defendant produce some information as to his
identity.
The defendant, by not providing information about his
identity, did not place into issue what would constitute proper
or improper

information to determine identity.

POINT IV.

The verdict of the trial court is substantiated

by the evidence and the law.

Clear error does not exist to

warrant a reversal of the conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On August 7, 1988 at 12:50 a.m., Officers Aiken and

Herburg of the Salt Lake Police Department were dispatched to 466
First Avenue on a loud party or disturbance call.

(R. 17,

Transcript P.1)
2.

Upon arrival, Officer Aiken determined that a loud

party was in progress.
host of the party.

Officers Aiken and Herburg contacted the

While talking to the host, the defendant

stepped up and interrupted the conversation.

(R. 17, Transcript

P.2).
3.

Officer Aiken observed the defendant to be carrying a

mug of beer and appeared to be under the age of 21.
Transcript P.2-3).

The defendant was intoxicated.

(R.17,
(R.17,

Transcript P.5-6).
4.

Based on these observations, Officer Aiken inquired if

the defendant had an I.D.
(R.17, Transcript P.3).

The defendant responded with a "ya".

5.

Officer Aiken asked the defendant to produce his I.D.

The defendant responded with "I don't think so".
Transcript P.3).

(R.17,

Officer Aiken requested the identification a

second time and the defendant again

responded with "No, I don't

think so". He then turned towards the door and started to go
back inside the house.
6.

(R.17, Transcript P.3-4).

Officer Aiken arrested the defendant and

him to the jail.

transported

At the jail the defendant was found to be in

possession of a valid driver's license.
POINT I.
MANWARING, BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE
VIOLATED SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 11-04-100 BY
CONCEALING HIS IDENTITY.
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 reads in pertinent part:
11-04-100 CONCEALING IDENTITY OR FURNISHING FALSE INFORMATION.
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally conceal or attempt to conceal his or her
identity, falsely identify himself or herself, or furnish or
give false or misleading information to any person charged
with enforcement of city ordinances, including but not
limited to the following:
A.

Any police officer of the city corporation;...

The defendant violated this ordinance by willfully failing
to identify himself at the officers lawful request . The
defendant argues that to violate the terms of the ordinance he
must verbally provide false information to the police officer.
Defendant supports this argument reasoning that to conceal one's
identity requires an "affirmative act".

The affirmative act

supposedly being the verbal conversation.
The defendant's argument is misplaced for the following
reasons:

First, the ordinance makes it unlawful to conceal one's

identity.

This requirement is satisfied by defendant's refusing

to provide a driver's license or another form of identity,
including orally identifying himself.

Second, the affirmative

act the defendant engaged in was the intentional and willful
refusal itself.

Thus, it was the defendant's failure to provide

any identification, not merely his silence which constituted the
violation.
Statutes and ordinances are to be liberally construed to
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
The words and phrases used are to be construed according to the
2
context and approved usage.

Applying these rules to the

ordinance, it is clear that the ordinance makes it unlawful to
conceal one's identity in any manner.

The defendant's willful

failure to produce identification was a concealment of his
identity.
POINT II.
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AN INVESTIGATORY "TERRY"
STOP AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
THE DEFENDANT.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an
investigatory stop is permissible, even though there is not

3
probable cause to make an arrest.
The Utah Court of Appeals is
4
in accord with this standard.
The determination of the

Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-2.
2
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-11.
3

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

4

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Ut.App. 1987).

presence of reasonable suspicion depends on the "Totality of the
5
Circumstances",
In the instant case, Officer Aiken noted an
apparently intoxicated person, who appeared to be under the age
of 21 holding an alcoholic beverage.

These facts are sufficient

to justify a "Terry" stop to investigate whether or not probable
cause existed for an arrest under Utah Code Annotated, Section
77-7-2 for the offenses of Public Intoxication
7
Possession of Alcohol.

and Minor in

From the undisputed facts it is clear that the stop,
detention and questioning of the defendant was within
constitutional standards.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT
LAWFULLY HAVE TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION UNDER KOELENDER
V. LAWSON IS MISPLACED.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
(1982) held that a California statute requiring a person to
provide "credible and reliable" identification and to account for
their presence when requested by a police officer under
circumstances which would justify a "Terry" stop was
unconstitutionally vague.

This holding was based on the failure

to clarify what the term "credible and reliable identification"
meant.

The U.S. Supreme Court determined that it was totally

within the arresting officer's discretion to determine what was

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988).
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12-2-060
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 6-12-130.

credible and reliable identification and therefore, the statute
could be readily subject to abuse.

The Court Stated;

"We conclude the statute as it has been construed is
unconstitutionally vague within meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify
what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect
provide "credible and reliable' identification."
In Kolender, the appellee had been arrested on 15 occasions
between March, 1985 and January, 1977, for violation of the
California statute.

There was no evidence established that the

appellee had violated any other California statutes or
ordinances.

The Court indicated that it was solely in the

discretion of the arresting officer to determine if the
g
identification produced was "credible and reliable".
The Court
concluded that the statute was "unconstitutionally vague on its
face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to
prescribe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in
order to satisfy the statute".
In Kolender, the appellee was arrested for failure to
provide "credible and reliable" identification.

Whatever

identification the appellee provided, it was within the officers
discretion to determine if it was credible and reliable.
In the present case, the Salt Lake Ordinance does not
require credible and reliable identification.
identity.

The defendant did not provide identity of any kind.

8

Id., at 353.

9

Id., at 358.

10

It only requires

Id., at p.361.

He did not even verbally identify himself to the police officer.
Such verbal or other identification may have fully satisfied the
officer that lie was not a minor.

Had the defendant provided some

identification, either verbal or written, the ordinance would
have been satisfied,

There is no discretioi 1 for the offi cer to

determine what identification is needed to satisfy the Salt Lake
Ordinance and, therefore, no risk of arbitrary enforcement.

The

ordinance simply makes it a crime to c sncea 1i one's iden ti t:y,
precisely what the defendant did by willfully not producing a
name or any other identification.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS OF GUILT IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE.
The standard of review of an appeal is the verdict of the
trial court shall not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous,,

The facts in the instant case are uncontroverted

and clearly support a violation of Salt Lake Ordinance 11-04-100.
The defendant did not supply the requested identification and
thereby concealed his identity.

The trial court's verdict should

stand.
It is a question for the trier of fact as to whether or not
defendant's actions, under the circumstances present, amounted to
a concealment.

The undisputed facts show the defendant refused

to provide identification and H I P trial court ecu I '1 cone 1 tide the
defendant's actions amounted to a concealment.
11

There is nothing

Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-35-26(g)(1982), adopting Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). Interpreted in State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

in the record that would warrant any appellate court in
overturning the trial court's decision.
CONCLUSION
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 was violated by the
defendant when he failed to provide identification at the police
officer's request.

The detention and arrest of the defendant was

within constitutional standards because the defendant appeared to
be underage, was in possession of an alcoholic beverage and was
intoxicated, giving rise to reasonable suspicion for the
detention and probable cause for the subsequent arrest.
The Salt Lake Ordinance is not unconstitutionally void
because its only requirement is that the defendant provide some
identifying information.

It is not in the discretion of the

officer to determine what identification is required.
Furthermore, the defendant in refusing to provide identification
did not place what identification would satisfy the ordinance
into issue.

Therefore, defendant's argument that "identity" as

used in the ordinance is vague and unenforceable is not at issue
under the facts of this case.
DATED this

day of August, 1989.

CHERYL D. LUKE,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE

1 hereby certs ty1 that ] MAILED/DELIVERED a true and correct
copy of the above

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S BRIEF to the defense

counsel Charles F. Loyd, Jr., Salt Lake Legal Defender
A s s o c i a t :i oi i

4 2 4 E a s t 5 0 0 Soi I t h
day of

S a J t: I ake C i ty, 1 J t ah
, 19

8 41 ] ] thi s
.

